Fed FRB/US, rebuilt
FRB/US
The shocks against the Fed’s own solver, the multipliers, and the limits.
The baseline agreement is an identity; the shocks are the evidence
| Check | Against | Result | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Solver, 100bp funds-rate shock | Fed’s pyfrbus 1.0.0 and 1.1.1, all 284 variables × 20 quarters; gate 1e−6; the Fed’s two releases differ by 1.4e−8 | 1.4e−8 and 1.8e−8 | pass |
| Solver, three further scenarios | Fed’s pyfrbus 1.0.0: federal purchases, personal tax rate, non-inertial Taylor rule; gate 1e−6 | 9.5e−9, 2.0e−8, 1.9e−8 | pass |
| 100bp shock, size of responses | Board’s published run (Laforte 2018) on its 2020Q1 design; gate ±10%. One design, not an exact replication; the unemployment peak is larger from later start dates | 0.96–1.04× the Board’s | pass |
| Purchases multiplier, yr 1, Taylor rule | CBO converted range 0.45–1.82 (lower third); FRB-US in Coenen et al. ≈0.95 (0.2 below) | 0.75 | partial |
| Transfers multiplier, yr 1 | CBO derived range 0.36–1.52 (typical Fed); FRB-US in Coenen et al. ≈0.48; below both (model economics, not implementation) | 0.28 | fail |
| Baseline, first projected quarter | FRED outturns, 2026Q3; one quarter, and the Board’s baseline, not ours | GDP growth −1.23pp; core PCE +0.80pp | weak |
| Inflation effect of the 2022–23 hikes | FRBSF Economic Letter 2025-03, about 3pp; mean 2022–24 (model economics, not implementation) | −0.12pp | fail |
| Baseline re-solve (tracking invariant) | LONGBASE; holds for any input (9.0e−9 on scrambled data), so not evidence | 7.3e−12 | by construction |
Baseline caveatMatching is not being right
Matching the Fed’s baseline does not make the baseline right: against the 2026Q3 outturn LONGBASE misses GDP growth and core PCE inflation (limits).
Evidence by dimension
| Dimension | Level | What would change it |
|---|---|---|
| Implementation fidelity | strong | Like-for-like gates on further official demos and closures |
| Predictive validation | not assessed | Vintage-preserving pseudo-out-of-sample evaluation |
| Identification | not applicable | None: an equation model, not an identified VAR |
| Policy counterfactuals | moderate | Model-consistent expectations in the hosted tools |
| Uncertainty | weak | Reviewed residuals and published coverage |
| Vintage reproducibility | moderate | Several historical model and data pairs tested |
About this implementationIndependent build, not endorsed
An independent implementation of the Federal Reserve Board's published model equations and data. It is not produced, maintained or endorsed by the Federal Reserve; do not present its results as official Federal Reserve estimates.
The solver match, the multipliers, a worked shock
Against the Fed’s own solver
The same shock in both implementations, at the reference’s own noise floor.
Maximum absolute residual, log scale; further left is closer
- ours vs the Fed’s pyfrbus, under shock
- the Fed’s two releases vs each other (dashed rule)
- tracking identity — round-off, not fidelity
Source: FRB/US replication
Source details
Source: us-frb-model VALIDATION.md at 162cfe6.
About this steptable, 3 points
| Test | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Tracking invariant | Re-solving the baseline reproduces LONGBASE, 284 endogenous variables over 2026Q1–2030Q4. | Against a 1e−8 gate, but an identity, not a comparison. init_trac sets each add-factor to minus that equation's residual at the input data, so the solve reproduces whatever it was tracked to, for any input: the model repository's test_tracking_invariant_holds_for_arbitrary_data passes at 9.0e−9 on a scrambled baseline with every accounting identity destroyed. Read the row below, not this one, as evidence. |
| Cross-validation | The same 100bp rffintay_aerr shock run in both implementations, all 284 variables × 20 quarters. |
On the October 2026 LONGBASE our maximum absolute difference is 1.4e−8 against pyfrbus 1.0.0 and 1.8e−8 against 1.1.1; the two Fed releases differ from each other by 1.4e−8, so ours are the same order of magnitude as the release-to-release gap, and all are inside the 1e−6 gate. |
| Three further scenarios | A +1% federal-purchases shock (egfe_aerr), a +2pp personal tax-rate shock (trp_aerr) and a +100bp shock under the non-inertial Taylor rule, against pyfrbus 1.0.0, all 284 variables × 20 quarters. |
Maximum absolute differences 9.5e−9, 2.0e−8 and 1.9e−8, all inside the 1e−6 gate. |
The Fed-vs-Fed comparison frames the others.
- The Board's two releases ship a byte-identical
model.xmland LONGBASE, and differ only in how Newton reuses its LU factorisation. - Yet they disagree by as much as this implementation disagrees with either, so agreement sits at the reference's own numerical noise, not at a chosen tolerance.
- All three residuals concentrate in the same series: the wage level
wpsnin absolute terms, and near-zero gap terms (dpadj) in relative terms.
Fiscal multipliers
Purchases multipliers sit inside CBO’s ranges and 0.2–0.3 below FRB-US in 2010: plausibility bands, not a test passed. Transfers sit below every matched range.
About this steptable, 6 points
| Quantity | Ours | Published | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gov. purchases, yr 1, inertial Taylor rule | 0.75 | CBO, Fed responding typically: 0.45–1.82 (converted); FRB-US in Coenen et al. Fig. 25, no accommodation: ≈0.95; Ramey (JEP 2019): "a surprisingly narrow range of 0.6 to 1" | inside the CBO range, lower third; about 0.2 below the 2010 FRB-US line |
| Gov. purchases, yr 2, inertial Taylor rule | 0.66 | CBO, Fed responding typically: 0.24–1.21 (converted) | inside the CBO range |
| Gov. purchases, yr 1, pegged funds rate | 0.79 | CBO, Fed response limited: 0.50–2.09 (converted) | inside, near the low end |
| Gov. purchases, yr 2, pegged funds rate | 0.93 | CBO, Fed response limited: 0.50–2.50 (converted); FRB-US in Coenen et al. Fig. 25, 2-yr accommodation: ≈1.25 | inside the CBO range, near the low end; about 0.3 below the 2010 FRB-US line |
| Personal tax cut, yr 1 | 0.23 | CBO, Fed not tightening: lower- and middle-income 0.3–1.5; higher-income 0.1–0.6 | below the first row, inside the second; regimes differ (ours is under the Taylor rule) |
| Personal tax cut, yr 2 | 0.32 | CBO, Fed not tightening: two-year cut for lower- and middle-income people 0.3–1.5; one-year cut for higher-income people 0.1–0.6. CBO publishes no central value | between the two rows; regimes differ (ours is under the Taylor rule) |
| Transfers, yr 1 | 0.28 | CBO, Fed responding typically (derived): 0.36–1.52; CBO Table 3, Fed not tightening: 0.4–2.1; FRB-US in Coenen et al. Fig. 28: ≈0.48 | below all three (model economics, not implementation). Depends on the regime: 0.28 under the inertial Taylor rule with the surplus rule on, 0.32 with the funds rate pegged and the fiscal rule off. FRB/US gives transfer recipients the same MPC as earners (hand-to-mouth share 0.31) |
- CBO ranges marked “converted” come from Whalen and Reichling, CBO Working Paper 2015-02, Table 2: the quarterly response to a one-quarter $1 impulse.
- We cumulate it into this page’s calendar-year ratio for a sustained shock. The conversion is ours, not CBO’s.
- The tax-cut ranges are from CBO (Feb 2015, Table 3), which assumes the Fed did not tighten.
- Coenen et al. (AEJ: Macroeconomics 2012) values are read from their charts (±0.1) and cover the 2009–10 FRB-US, whose expectations mode they do not state.
- Ramey’s survey range pools estimates across horizons and monetary regimes.
- The yr-1 purchases value depends on the shock: 0.75 for a +1%-of-GDP rise, about 0.83 for small shocks, 0.93 for a 1% cut. The cut/rise gap is an artefact of the model file adding growth in logs, not economics; CBO assumes symmetry.
- Pegged purchases stay below 1 partly because the demo surplus rule raises the personal tax rate; with it off, the pegged yr-2 value is 1.04.
- Sources and the conversion: us-frb-model docs/benchmarks.md.
A worked shock, against the Board
On the Board’s 2020Q1 design, all three published responses to a 100bp tightening are within 10% of the Board’s run.
More detailtable, notes
| Response | Board | Ours, 2020Q1 | Ours ÷ Board | Ours, 2026Q1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core inflation, trough (pp) | −0.0345, q8 | −0.0330, q9 | 0.96× | −0.034, q8 |
| Output gap, trough (pp) | −0.486, q8 | −0.471, q8 | 0.97× | −0.50, q7 |
| Unemployment, peak (pp) | +0.219, q8 | +0.228, q9 | 1.04× | +0.28, q9 |
| Real GDP, trough (%) | not published | – | – | −0.56, q8 |
| Funds rate (pp) | +1.00, then −0.27 | – | – | +1.00, then −0.265 |
- The Board’s design. Laforte shocked in 2020Q1 with the Board’s ping settings: no zero lower bound, no thresholds and a fixed equilibrium real rate. The 2020Q1 column repeats that; the model repository gates each response within 10% of the note.
- Not an exact replication. 2020Q1 is realised history in the October 2026 LONGBASE; the Board shocked its 2018 projection, which is archived only as an EViews database.
- Across data vintages. The April 2026 LONGBASE gives 0.96×, 0.98× and 1.01×, so unemployment sits at 1.01–1.04× the Board’s.
- Verdict re-banded on 18 Nov 2026. This row read “partial” when it was scored on the 2026Q1 run, where unemployment is 1.26× the Board’s. It reads “pass” now that it is scored on the Board’s own 2020Q1 design, against the model repository’s ±10% gate; the gate itself did not change.
- The unemployment peak depends on the start date. It is 1.04× the Board’s from 2020Q1, 1.26× from 2026Q1 and up to 1.38× from 2035Q1. Core PCE and the output gap stay within 10% from every start date tested (2020Q1 to 2040Q1).
- The hosted default.
pe-macro frbus-shock --var rffintay_aerr --shock 1.0starts in 2026Q1 and is the run in the last column (GDP trough in 2027Q4, unemployment peak in 2028Q1). The Overview example starts in 2026Q3, the first projected quarter, so its troughs fall two quarters later (GDP −0.55% in 2028Q2). - Earlier model generations move inflation more. The Board’s previous model gives −0.062pp for core PCE, and the −0.08pp in the 2014 FEDS Note describes the pre-2018 model. The Board attributes the smaller response to re-estimating the wage–price block through 2017.
Board: Laforte (2018), FEDS Notes, doi:10.17016/2380-7172.2306, Figure 2, VAR expectations; the Board reports the output gap, not GDP. Ours: us-frb-model results/inflation_transmission.md (2020Q1 and the start-date sweep) and results/site_responses.md (2026Q1) at 162cfe6, October 2026 LONGBASE. The 2026Q1 run also matches the Board’s own pyfrbus to the cross-validation result above (1.4e−8).